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Graham Ley 
It is the objective of this article to suggest some possible affinities of the 
theory propounded by Austin a generation ago with unresolved dilemmas about 
the performer, in the specific form of the actor in the European tradition of 
conventional theatre. My starting point for this investigation arose in discussions 
with the English theatre director John Barton, who is engaged on a theatrical 
project within the scope of Greek myth, on the passage from story-telling to 
enactment. What soon emerges in this particular line of inquiry is the disturbing 
cultural innovation of the actor, a presupposition of almost all critical writing on 
the European theatre, but conceptually a distinct addition to the active performers 
of the indigenous chorus (dramatic, pre-dramatic, or non-dramatic), and to the 
performative capacities of the narrative rhapsode of epic poetry. The objective 
should be to establish a possible conceptual framework for the individuation of this 
figure, which would also help to define and to locate the particularities of an 
emergent theatrical drama within the complexities and differentials of 
performance. 
The methodology of this article is, then, an attempt to associate some 
earlier investigations I conducted into the meaning of the Greek words for "act" 
(hypokrinesthai) and "actor" (hypokrites) with some of the implications of 
Austin's theory of 'performatives', that broad band of statements which appear to 
be "doing things with words." Initially, my objective will be (in section I) to 
extricate Austin's theory from its applied use in criticism, and restore it to a state 
in which its primary relation to a concept of 'performance' is once again apparent. 
I shall then (in section H) sketch in the conclusions I myself reached about the 
semantic function of the Greek word for actor. In section III I shall adduce further 
arguments, which suggest the potential relevance of Austin's insights to some 
central concerns of contemporary performance theory. My own conclusions are 
set forward briefly in sections IV and V, as initial propositions to which others 
with more resolute spirits may return to reconstruct, deny, or deconstruct as they 
choose. 
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I 
The scope of Sandy Petrey's useful study Speech Acts and Literary 
Theory conveniently raises the problem of the relationship between the 
philosopher J.L.Austin's concept of 'performatives' and performance theory.1 
"Performing the Performative"—the theoretical equivalent of Begin the 
Beguinel—was the title of a central chapter of Petrey's book, and this was 
undoubtedly because, as Petrey declared, in the recent development of "practical 
criticism with a speech-act orientation, pride of place is held by drama" [86]. This 
development stemmed from the leading works of Austin and Searle, and the 
concentration on drama in the eighties embraced major works from Elam, Rivers, 
and Felman, on the Elizabethans, on Golden Age Spanish dramatists, and on the 
comedy of Molière respectively.2 Petrey's assessment of that writing also gave 
considerable weight to the exacting analysis of Stanley Fish, in his definitive essay 
on Shakespeare's Coriolanus? 
My own intention is not to contest Petrey's decisive conclusions in favor 
of speech-act criticism, nor to duplicate his useful summary of those leading texts, 
but to question the limitations so far placed on speech-act criticism, and propose 
an hypothetical extension into a theory of the performer. The central problem for 
me lies exactly in this contrast between criticism and theory, which Petrey's book 
highlights so well. As Petrey observed in his opening chapters, the concept of 
"illocutionary utterances" was introduced by Austin in the William James Lectures 
of 1955 as a component of linguistic theory. In many respects Austin's approach 
shows similar concerns to the later work of Wittgenstein, and subsequent writers 
have seen no difficulty in linking Austin, Wittgenstein, and Searle. By contrast, 
what Petrey was supporting was the validity of speech-act criticism, which he saw 
as potentially co-extensive with literature, and which he was at pains to defend 
from the apparently playful subversions of deconstruction. For Petrey, this validity 
is drawn from the profoundly social tenets of the central perceptions of speech-act 
theory, which provide a confirmation "that all kinds of language make tangible the 
network of relationships and agreements in which humans and their signs are 
embedded" (89). Like many critics seeking a refuge from the statutory 
uncertainties of deconstruction, Petrey found the guarantee of a social referent of 
some kind far too attractive to sacrifice to what he determined as a dominant 
critical tendency. 
Yet, the dramatic criticism which Petrey defined as "speech-act criticism" 
has, in fact, little to do with performance, despite the title of his chapter. It is, 
however, accurately defined as criticism because it is effectively a collection of 
perceptions applied to dramatic dialogue, whether in Marlowe, Shakespeare, 
Calderon, or Molière. Specifically, in relation to speech-act theory, this kind of 
criticism identifies occasions of "illocutionary utterances", or "performatives" in 
a script, and by reference either to their frequency (of different varieties), 
Fall 1998 7 
recurrence (of one dominant variety), or explicit significance in the action of a 
play constructs what might easily be regarded as a form of dramatic (i.e. textual) 
criticism. The speech-act itself—"I pray", "I request you", "I do beseech you" (in 
Coriolanus), what Austin described as doing things with words—is given priority 
in the text, and so, by extension, on the stage. Petrey's synthesis of the work of 
Elam, Rivers, and Fish finds its most succinct expression in a quotation from 
Rivers: the contention, as Petrey chose to describe it, that "the theater of Golden 
Age Spain, like that of Elizabethan England, provided a socio-linguistic laboratory 
within which to test old and new ideas about the authority of speech acts."4 To 
this important conjunction of renaissance conventions, Petrey would undoubtedly 
add the classical theatre of France, as examined in the study by Shoshana Felman. 
The classic speech act, as identified by Austin and others after him, is "I 
will" in the marriage ceremony, where no action is performed, but one takes 
place.5 This "utterance" is not constative, because it describes nothing, but 
performative, because it is clearly understood to achieve something. That 
understanding is communal, and proceeds from what might be termed communal 
or social conventions. In this respect, few would be willing to contest Petrey's 
suggestive grouping (following Rivers) of what we might easily consider the major 
European Renaissance dramatic conventions in a demonstrable concern for the 
social conventions, which themselves include the very possibility of theatre. 
Petrey was almost certainly right in pointing to a common characteristic of 
Renaissance theatre, which takes different forms but without which it would be 
hard to conceive of a Renaissance play. Anyone with a reasonable inclination 
might care to test this contention by taking Austin's hundred or more 
performatives listed in his concluding lecture and applying them (and variants) to, 
for example, the opening act of Shakespeare's King Lear. As one form of 
dramatic analysis, speech-act criticism seems likely to justify its existence simply 
by calling attention to the operation and to its importance in the texts, at least 
within one major period. 
But, it is still disappointing for the larger ambitions of performance 
theory that the notion of "performance" in this kind of criticism is largely 
subsumed in the concept of the "performative" itself. There is just the hint of a 
helpful tautology here, a kind of complacency that relies on the coinage of a 
theoretical term in another context (that of the philosophy of language, to accept 
for once Searle's insistence on that term) to achieve a critical self-sufficiency 
which is incontestable. A more skeptical view might ask, in the light of these 
apparent revelations, what more we can actually claim to know about performance, 
namely the art or nature of representation or acting? Does the criticism lead to 
significant theoretical insights into this art? Or, is it essentially derivative, reliant 
on a theory about language for what amount to no more than perceptions of an 
indicative nature—pointing to, or marking the written text, if you like? 
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II 
For what I have to say from this point forward, I must refer to an 
argument I first presented in a classical journal of philology.6 In that study I was 
concerned with the ancient Greek theatre and, more particularly, with the nature 
and original function of the actor in the theatre at Athens. In composing my 
hypotheses on the original function of the (Athenian) actor, I took stock of a 
debate over the original meaning of the Greek word hypokrites (which came to 
mean "actor"), which had been waged with polemical force by classicists in the 
nineteenth century. The division of opinion lay squarely between an initial 
meaning of "interpreter" and one of "answerer," and in the postwar period the 
argument had been resumed by Albin Lesky and Gerald Else. Much of the 
evidence for the meaning of the noun lay in the antecedent use of the verb 
hypokrinesthai, which is found in the far earlier epic poems of Homer. My own 
approach to the problem was to investigate the wider deployment of this verb in 
the Histories of Herodotus, who was a contemporary of the tragedians Sophocles 
and Euripides. 
My conclusion from a survey of usage and context in the Histories was 
that there was strong additional support from this source for the idea of 
"answering," but that this evidence pointed to some characteristics of meaning that 
could not be ignored. I analyzed these under two headings: that of the nature of 
the action (represented by the verb), and that of the quality of the agent. Under the 
first heading, it was clear that the verb designated a final and decisive "response" 
to a proposal or question which, for the historian, often entailed historic and/or 
fatal results. The action designated by the verb would then take its place in a 
relatively formal sequence, leading to significant results: to express this concisely, 
for hypokrinesthai "speaking" is "doing," and a "response" is an "action." These 
conclusions were made all the more substantial by looking at the agents involved 
as subjects of the verb. In summary: "The action signified by hypokrinesthai is 
only appropriate to those who have a particular status, and only on occasions of 
great moment" (16). Kings, tyrants, representatives of communities, notably 
ambassadors, the prophetic oracle at Delphi, heads of families, and—in one 
striking instance—a woman offered the choice of redeeming one of her brother, 
husband, or children from a penalty of death. Choice of the word "moment" was 
careful: the impetus of history is falling on these individuals, and speaking, as 
represented by this term, becomes a final, decisive, significant action. 
My immediate concern in this examination of just one word was, at the 
time, to make the closest possible approach to a vital moment in theatrical 
history—the introduction of the actor—which was otherwise obscured by a lack 
of evidence. As I had no theoretical intentions, I did not pursue my analysis 
beyond the conclusion that this verb was used to describe what the first individual 
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performer did, which was (almost inevitably) to "respond," in mask and so in 
character, to the chorus. As Else had previously suggested, this activity could be 
readily demonstrated in the earlier surviving plays of Aeschylus, those which 
substantially depended on the use of just two individual performers.7 Historically, 
there is little doubt that the first individual performer was the playwright/ 
composer, who trained the chorus, and was officially known by that term 
(didaskalos = trainer/teacher). My own conclusion was that hypokrinesthai was 
initially used to describe the activity of the playwright as performer, and that the 
nominal term hypokrites was only required once an additional performer was 
added. This term then became "the definitive title of a professional class," and it 
and the verb very quickly established themselves in the technical meaning "actor" 
and "act," with direct reference to the theatrical competitions at Athens. 
Conceived as they had been firmly within the exclusive tradition of 
classical philology, my original investigations had failed to take account of the 
context afforded by Austin's (and Searle's) work on performatives, or—more 
strictly, in Austin's revised terminology—"illocutionary acts." To anyone familiar 
with Austin's theories in How To Do Things With Words, there could have been 
no doubt about the acute resemblance between my formulations and his 
conclusions about one significant aspect of (the English) language. Fortunately, 
what my state of blindness had secured was an independent and relatively detailed 
exploration of the incidence of an undoubted "performative" in its context, one 
which the absence of any spoken parole from the ancient langue had firmly fixed 
in the historical narrative of Herodotus. 
Ill 
Austin himself was extremely tentative about the relation between speech 
and writing or, more precisely, between the social convention (which he saw as 
attached to living speech) and any representations of that convention which might 
occur in what he clearly regarded as the secondary, or "parasitic," contexts of 
written discourse. This particular dilemma was turned on him (and on Searle as 
his successor) by Jacques Derrida, who read his hesitation as a striking example 
of the unjustifiable priority afforded to speech over writing in western 
philosophical thought.8 The case against Austin has also been argued, less 
flamboyantly but to great effect, by Mary Louise Pratt and Stanley Fish. In a study 
largely devoted to the novel, Pratt attempted to break down the distinction between 
"ordinary language" and "poetic language," dissolving all discourse into the 
theoretical frame of the creation of possible worlds: 
Non-fictional narrative accounts are world-creating in the same 
sense as are works of literature and, say, accounts of dreams. 
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After all, the actual world is a member of the set of all possible 
worlds.9 
For Pratt, what Austin regards as an apparently unproblematic "reality" which 
guarantees speech-acts their conventional validity is far more accurately 
understood as one distinct creation amongst many: "The real lesson speech-act 
theory has to offer is that literature is context, too, not the absence of one 
The analysis of Coriolanus as a speech-act play by Stanley Fish was also 
accompanied by a closely related attack on what Fish regards as "the myth of 
ordinary language." Both Pratt and Fish share what might be called a standard 
post-structuralist skepticism about the referentiality of language to a "real" world, 
and would, as a consequence, be more inclined to relate speech-act theory to 
Wittgenstein's formula of "language games." With similar effect to the critique 
advanced by Derrida, this approach simply abolishes the privileges afforded to one 
kind of discourse over others: 
One might object that this has the consequence of making all 
discourse fictional: but it would be just as accurate to say that it 
makes all discourse serious, and it would be better still to say 
that it puts all discourse on a par.10 
And with specific relation to the issue of theatrical discourse, Fish later returned 
to the argument with further firm assertions of parity: 
If by 'stage utterances' one understands utterances whose 
illocutionary force must be inferred or constructed, then all 
utterances are stage utterances, and one cannot mark them off 
from utterances that are 'serious.'11 
Austin found it difficult to follow traces of the social into representative 
discourses for the very reason that he found describing the conventions of his own 
society—revealed in the necessities of spoken social activity (e.g. the marriage 
ceremony)—almost an embarrassment, if not done wittily, to an educated man.12 
There is no effective distinction between "performatives" or "illocutionary 
utterances" in socially engaged speech and in other forms of discourse, provided 
one is willing to acknowledge the presence of society in all forms of language. 
Furthermore, the "social convention" to which Austin refers, and which appears 
to be a corollary of performatives, can be described and tabulated in detail, with 
the conclusion that the presence of a performative in any discourse must be seen 
as simultaneously an allusion to the existence of the specific social context which 
"orders" its appearance. This is as true of mockery and ridicule, and of pretense 
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or deceit, as it is of any other instance which Austin would have described as 
''parasitic." 
Explicit in the notion of "performatives" is that of performance, and 
although it is clear that the meaning of "accomplish" was paramount for Austin 
in choosing the term ("doing" things with words), being both heard and seen in 
doing them cannot logically in the great majority of cases be far secondary in 
importance.13 This inviting observational possibility has been the motive force 
behind what I have described in the first part of this essay as speech-act criticism, 
effectively summarized by Petrey and capable of greater amplification. But, in 
addition to the contributions to a textual criticism, there has been a number of 
related speculations within performance theory. One of the most striking was that 
by the phenomenologist Bert States.14 In his argument for what he determined as 
the "three phenomenal modes" of theatrical performance (specifically acting), 
States was firm about his "idea of theatre as an act of speech" (360), which he 
reiterated, with more force, at his conclusion: 
My intention here is not to offer a complete phenomenology of 
his [the actor's] art but to treat it as an act of speech—a 
discourse, one might say, on our behavior—that can be broken 
down into the pronominal triad that is the basis of all speech 
(375). 
Within this hypothesis, he had offered his tripartite division under the schema: 
I (actor) = Self-expressive mode 
You (audience) = Collaborative mode 
He (character) = Representational mode (360). 
States was plainly aware that this was a phenomenology, not a statement of 
disjoined categories—"It is precisely our ability to integrate them [the three 
modes] that lends the unique depth and texture to the theatre experience" 
(370)—but it is his strong sense of a social context for this highly "performative" 
notion of performance that I wish to isolate: 
The advantage of thinking about the actor in such terms is not 
that we learn anything new about him, but that we have a better 
basis for seeing how his performance awakens our interest, not 
only as individuals 'sitting at a play' but as members of a social 
species that 'commissions' the actor to enact plays about our 
various concerns and addictions (375). 
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This quite fundamental perception has also affected gender studies within 
performance, notably those by Sue-Ellen Case and Judith Butler.15 Case 
approached the problems of ancient Athenian theatrical presentation from the 
standpoint that, given the absence of women performers, any presentation of 
female characters was a representation, which should not be seen as some form 
of neutral or merely reflective mimesis. Her prime assertion again draws attention 
to a highly specific social context for performance: 
The Athenian theatre practice created a political and aesthetic 
arena for ritualised and codified gender behaviour, linking it to 
core privileges and restrictions (322). 
This thesis finds confirmation in the more directly performative and 
phenomenological analysis of gender by Butler, who describes a social necessity 
that might be seen to underlie Case's formulation cited above: "Gender reality is 
performative which means, quite simply, that it is real only to the extent that it is 
performed" (527). The implications for theory are expanded decisively in the 
following paragraph: 
As a consequence, gender cannot be understood as a role which 
either expresses or disguises an interior 'self,' whether that 
'self is conceived as sexed or not. As performance which is 
performative, gender is an 'act,' broadly construed, which 
constructs the social fiction of its own psychological interiority 
(528). 
The implications of these studies move away from any specific textual 
criticism towards the possibilities for theory, notably a theory which helps to 
define the act of representation itself. Prominent among those possibilities is 
States's idea of the audience as a "social species that 'commissions' the actor," 
which is clearly a development of the reader-response proposals of 
phenomenology.16 For Case, it was the general term of "Athenian theatre 
practice" which provided the "arena" for representation, while Butler extended the 
argument on gender to cover the full concept of "performance" itself. These 
conclusions seem to me to be compatible, and can be brought together in 
conjunction with my own approach, which centers on the Athenian actor. 
Simon Goldhill, in the republication and revision of an important article 
during the eighties, insisted on the undeniably ideological characteristics of the 
major Athenian dramatic festival, the City or Great Dionysia.17 For Goldhill, the 
centrality of performance in the democratic constitution of Athens must be a guide 
to our reception of texts; and Tobin Nellhaus, drawing on the work of Havelock, 
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Else, and Ong, offered a further dimension to this insistence by citing tragedy 
securely in the historic transition from an oral to a written culture.18 Nellhaus 
drew attention to what was, for tragic performance and the elaboration/creation of 
what we term drama, a crucial point of contact: 
The combination of chorus and actor marked in a symbolic form 
the concurrence of (and transition between) the collectivist oral 
culture and the individualising manuscript culture (63). 
The authorial qualities of the tragic script, in its prescribed originality and 
individuality in competition, must also be combined with an acknowledgment that 
the "writer," as trainer of the chorus, was the first "actor" in the combination to 
which Nellhaus referred. But the weakness in Nellhaus's argument is that he 
takes the existence, or probability, of the actor for granted, as an agent upon 
whom this historic function (of the text) can be inscribed. 
The present state of studies provides us with the central concept of a 
"commission" to perform, proceeding from the audience and the community 
(States, Goldhill); with the certainty of the performative quality of representation 
clarified by gender (Case, Butler); and with the historic context of orality into 
textuality (Havelock, Ong, Nellhaus). But the introduction of the actor 
underscores a primary dilemma: the "why?" and the "what?" of the invention of 
the individual performer remain the black hole of theory. 
IV 
My own proposition would determine the creation of the first individual 
performer as the embodiment of the performative, of the "illocutionary utterance" 
that gave rise to drama. That this "entry of the actor" took place at one moment 
in the transition from orality to textuality is quite clear, as is the existence of an 
historic commission from the audience to proceed to representation.19 The pré-
existence of masks in the worship of Dionysus was also decisive, in that its 
contingency provided a suitable material means for embodiment, and for the rapid 
development to a plurality of representations in one form (called drama). But the 
historic moment for the requirement of the performative to be performed remains 
a particularity, which the existing components of theory can do no more than 
locate.20 It may, however, be possible to define that location with a little more 
accuracy. 
The emphasis that States brings to bear on the actor is of some 
significance in historical theory, because the actor is, for Greek antiquity, to be 
distinguished from the performance and the performer of the Greek chorus. A 
recently discovered fragment of Greek text has been attributed with some 
confidence to the composer Stesichorus (whose name means "chorus-establisher"), 
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and the general belief is that the text is part of a choral song.21 The existing 
fragments present a sung narrative of the departure from Thebes of Polynices, one 
of the two sons of Oedipus, which contains direct discourse from the mother of the 
young men. This discourse is substantially a prophecy, and there are clear 
indications that another "speaker" was Tiresias, himself a prophet inspired by 
Apollo. The major fragment of the song also reveals that the direct discourse, as 
is the case in Homeric epic, is framed by a concluding identification of the speaker 
in the past tense. 
What can be determined decisively about this fragment is that it is a form 
of sung narrative, and in that respect it bears a very close resemblance to some of 
the choral songs in Aeschylus, which contain similarly framed representations of 
direct discourses.22 If the fragment is rightly attributed to Stesichorus, then it 
points clearly to the tradition of choral performances in the Greek west (southern 
Italy and Sicily) and to a period at least one generation, and probably more, before 
the emergence of drama at Athens in the years following 534 BC. What is 
striking here is the prominence of prophecy as the occasion for quoted speech, or 
framed direct discourse, although recent research (as the research on 
hypokrinesthai) has pointed to the existence and recurrent significance of 
performatives in the far earlier, framed direct discourses of Homeric epic.23 
The distinction I wish to draw here is between the pre-existence of 
performative characteristics (e.g. a report of an "illocutionary utterance," namely 
a prophecy) in a narrative form, and the actual embodiment of performatives in 
performance and in the individual actor. The Athenian tragic moment is decisive 
in its insistence that the "response" itself—the "illocutionary utterance"—should 
be of the essence of the drama which is commissioned. There is, in this process, 
a polarization which arises from the nature and status of the tragic chorus itself. 
The tragic chorus, unlike the disembodied narrative agents of Stesichorus, is 
characterized by mask, and the surviving plays demonstrate that this "character" 
is regularly fixed in extreme agitation in crisis. This exact determination of status 
in the Athenian tragic chorus creates precise conditions for the performative by 
embodying an urgent requirement for speech as action, which will itself solicit the 
embodiment of an individual performer: the actor, the hypokrites, whose existence 
is to respond decisively to demand, a demand which is formulated by the dramatic 
insistence of the tragic chorus. 
The degree to which "performing the performative" is the closest 
definition of the Athenian actor in this localized moment of his creation can be 
demonstrated in the subsequent typology of non-tragic choral performance, which 
divides into archaic and innovative. The choral composers Simonides and 
Bacchylides were both closely associated with Athens in the period of the 
development of tragedy, but were not involved in tragic composition. In one 
striking fragment of Simonides's otherwise mutilated choral work, the framed 
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narrative that survives contains a prayer from Danae to Zeus for her salvation, in 
which the immediacy of her fears for herself and her child are exploited for what 
has been traditionally called pathos, but which has been recently redefined more 
accurately by Patricia Rosenmeyer as the language of isolation.24 This isolation 
determines a sharp distinction from tragedy, and from the dynamics of response: 
The text crackles with the constant tension of attempts at 
communication . . . Messages are sent out into the void, and the 
intended audience [namely Zeus] never responds, in word or 
action, within the confines of the fragment (25). 
By contrast, one of the surviving songs of Bacchylides takes the form of 
a sung exchange between a king of Athens (Aegeus) and a chorus, whose agitation 
and excitement express themselves in questions which repeatedly demand a 
response from the king.25 Both songs may possibly be dithyrambs, the 
performances by a circular chorus of fifty that accompanied dramatic 
representations at Athens. But, the theatrical influence of "performing the 
performative" drives Bacchylides's composition towards an explicit mimicry of the 
actor, in his essentially responsive relation with the chorus. This is signally absent 
from Simonides, in whose conservatively framed narrative the continuity of non-
dramatic choral composition inherited from Stesichorus remains untransformed. 
Y 
The identification of the "response" as the vehicle for "performing the 
performative" at Athens is the direct result of a pressing need for generic 
description. The act of naming the unknown (in hypokrinesthai and hypokrites) 
seizes on the term that can effectively stand as an index of the whole spectrum of 
performative possibilities, and the accent is placed on what became for the Greeks 
in later aesthetic theory the primary intellectual sense of hearing in contrast to 
sight.26 
I do not want, at the present time, to extend the argument into the 
Renaissance, where the existing scope of criticism has adequately recorded the 
overwhelming role of performatives in constituting the text. To cite one obvious 
example, the immense influence on Elizabethan drama of legal hypothesis and 
antagonism stemming from the Inns of Court would seem to offer adequate 
grounds for an advance from the critical observation of performatives to theory.27 
But, there seems to be no reason to stop short of noting here that the "Quern 
quaeritis?" trope has long been recognized as a responsive system, and as the 
probable nucleus of the later dramatic representation that we find in the Cycles. 
The absence of the mask from Christian liturgical worship would seem to have 
been one factor in the relatively slow development of the latent performativity of 
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this responsive system. But, it is unequivocally as embodied performatives, of a 
remarkably narrow and uniquely authoritative range, that we find the actor in the 
much later established texts from the Cycles, such as—to isolate an arbitrary 
triptych—The Creation, The Crucifixion, and The Last Judgement.2* 
The absence of the chorus, in addition to the mask, from the origins of 
medieval drama overrides the particularity of the Greek moment in suggesting the 
absolute recurrence of a requirement to perform the performative: one which 
might help us to achieve a definition of the European actor in at least two crucial 
moments of his (re)creation. That this definition may also extend far beyond the 
readjustments achieved at the Renaissance could be apparent in the choice of 
Brecht to harness his two most ambitious scripts to the performative modes of 
recanting (The Life of Galileo) and judging (The Caucasian Chalk Circle). Both 
of these are exemplary texts in relocating the actor with performative 
circumstances in what—for Brecht—was undoubtedly an historic "commission," 
undertaken through the particularity of his own, materialist, performance theory. 
In summary, my contention is that Austin's theory of the relationship of 
speech to action offers strong possibilities for an explanation of the creation of the 
actor as a function of the formation (and reformation) of European drama. One 
final conclusion to this sequence of argument could be awkward for some 
contemporary tendencies in performance theory, and that is that the European 
actor, in diverse contingencies, is a function of the social demand for the dramatic 
script as a text, as an 'interweaving' of performative discourses. 
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